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Chapter 13 
Mindfulness: Challenges to the cognitive-behavioral approach 
 
Fabio Giommi 
Abstract 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first provides some general considerations 
and introduces the second, a comparison study on mindfulness training as an effective 
component in treating emotional disorders.  
Part I. Mindfulness approaches challenge some basic tenets of clinical cognitivism. 
Firstly, the pivotal aspect in the therapeutic process seems to be ‘deautomatizing-
disidentifying’ rather than changing attitudes, schemas, etc. To escape automaticity, 
patients learn to relate to experiences as mental events within a field of 
awareness. Secondly, a question is posed by mindfulness approaches: is there a non-
conceptual way of conscious knowing? Mindfulness is spoken of as ‘insight meditation’ 
(i.e. ‘a non-conceptual and penetrating seeing into the nature of mind’; Kabat-Zinn 
(2003). Such non-conceptual ‘seeing’ is a form of knowing not yet recognized in any 
cognitive model of mind, and results as the key factor in reducing dysfunctional 
automaticity.  
Part II. F. Giommi, H. Barendregt, L. Oliemeulen, J. van Hoof, J. Tinge, A. Coenen, 
and P. van Dongen conducted a randomized controlled trial. Mindfulness-Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) was compared to Psychoeducation (PE, a standard psychiatric 
intervention) in a sample of patients with emotional disorders. Assessments were made 
on symptoms reduction (5 scales of depression, anxiety, quality of life) and attentional 
functioning (6 neuropsychological tasks, EEG recordings). MBSR was found at least as 
efficacious as PE. Preliminary results suggest that MBSR exerts a positive effect on 
attention. To date no comparison with an established intervention has been performed: 
this was the first exploratory study on such issue, and the first to consider the specific 
effects of mindfulness on attentional processes. New confidence is gained in applying 
MBSR as an effective component in treating emotional disorders.  
 
 
Part I: Introduction and some general considerations  
F. Giommi 
 
1. Radicals and incorporationists 
It becomes critically important that those persons coming to the field with 
professional interest and enthusiasm recognize the unique qualities and 
characteristics of mindfulness as a meditative practice, with all that implies, so 
that mindfulness is not simply sized upon as the next promising cognitive 
behavioral technique or exercise, decontextualized, and "plugged" into a 
behaviorist paradigm with the aim of driving desirable changes, or of fixing what 
is broken (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p.145). 
 
Despite the fact that the use of mindfulness-based approaches is very recent, it is already 
possible to outline a map and pick out some of the trendlines. In the recent cognitivist 
community’s fast growth of interest in mindfulness, two different approaches can be 
discerned. They are profoundly different and potentially divergent in perspective. There 
are those who view the expression mindfulness-based in a ‘radical’ manner: i.e. in the 
actual sense of placing mindfulness at the very root and heart of therapeutic interventions, 
whenever founded on mindfulness. These researchers see the meaning and value of 
mindfulness in the opportunity it provides to explore new clinical directions, broadening 
the conceptual and epistemological categories of present-day cognitivism, and opening 
the way for a constructive exchange with meditative traditions that study the nature of the 
mind. I call them ‘radicals’ and I reckon this list might include Segal, Williams, Teasdale, 
Linehan, and Schwartz. I believe that most radicals are generally recognizable, and 
characterized by the fact that they refer more or less directly to the fundamental 
experiences of Kabat-Zinn’s Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program. 
This is based on mindfulness and on the knowledge that comes from the Buddhist 
tradition, and that’s it. Without the addition of cognitive techniques and models, even 
though it does make precious use of scientific research (e.g. on stress). Another 
characteristic is that they all have a non-superficial familiarity with the practice of 
meditation, particularly Vipassana – insight or mindfulness meditation – and its core 
ideas. For them it is perfectly clear that any talk about the development of mindfulness 
has no plausible meaning other than within direct, personal experience. 
On the other hand, it seems that a second group of researchers, whom I shall refer 
to as ‘incorporationists’, can be characterized by the fact that they seem to consider 
mindfulness as a concept or a procedure that might be usefully incorporated in existing 
clinical protocols if translated in cognitive-behavioral conceptualizations. These 
researchers tend to reformulate and accept mindfulness’ perspective in as far as it fits into 
the already existing conceptual framework. For them, cognitive-behavioral theories come 
first and from this starting point it is possible to explore the clinical utility of 
mindfulness. Their attitude towards meditation seems, all things considered, somewhat 
perplexed; some of them actively seek alternative methods, using cognitive 
‘technologies’ other than meditation, to develop mindfulness. I believe that a list of 
incorporationists would include Wells, Roemer, and Orsillo, who work particularly with 
cognitive psychopathological models to treat anxiety. Another name stemming from the 
area of behaviorism is Hayes.  
It seems to me that the radicalists’ approach is more fruitful: if we take 
mindfulness seriously (and indeed, mindfulness is just a consequence of ‘taking 
consciousness seriously’; Chalmers, 1996), this might open up innovative and promising 
horizons for the cognitive approach. The study presented in the second part of this 
chapter exemplifies a radicalist’s stance. This is the first comparison study to date 
showing that a mindfulness-based program is at least as effective as a well-established 
psychiatric treatment in reducing symptoms in a mixed sample of patients with 
depressive and anxious disorders. This study corroborates the literature suggesting that a 
wide range of psychological disorders are positively affected by mindfulness. This 
indicates that mindfulness operates in processes at a basic/transversal level of various 
kinds of emotional disorders. Mindfulness seems to be a general factor that affects the 
mechanism of emotional change. Which are these processes be and what might be the 
factor capable to affect them? In trying to outline an answer, it appears quite clear that 
mindfulness challenges some of clinical cognitivism’s basic tenets. We shall here 
consider two of these challenges. 
 
2. De-automatizing versus changing cognitions 
Mindfulness operates by modifying not the contents of the mind but our relationship with 
them. Experience teaches that by means of an intuitive, immediate ‘seeing’ - and 
accepting attitude - the coercive force of some cognitive-affective mental contents 
gradually becomes weaker and fades away. The central issue of cure then becomes that of 
dis-indentification from our own thoughts-emotions through awareness. In conjunction, 
the central theme of ‘neurotic’ disorders appears to revolve around the automatization of 
cognitive and emotional processes and around the crystalization, at various levels, of 
thoughts, feelings, and body-reaction patterns, which automatize outside awareness and 
volition/intention. Segal, Williams, and Teasdale (2002) point out that de facto traditional 
Cognitive Therapy (CT) itself is probably effective especially as a result of this! This 
runs counter to the declared purpose of CT: to modify beliefs regarding the content of 
dysfunctional thoughts. However, this objective actually promotes an implicit process 
that first (and perhaps foremost) involves a change in the relationship with dysfunctional 
thoughts and emotions, leaving them to be perceived increasingly as events in the mind, 
and thus not as reality (Teasdale, Hayhurst, Pope, et al., 2002; Barber, & DeRubeis, 
1989).   
Decentering, considered by classic CT as a means to change content, could be the 
factual therapeutic factor. There is a huge amount of experimental studies showing the 
effects of automatic biases induced by anxiety and depression on the perceptive processes 
during the initial phases of information processing (Gotlib & MacLeod, 1997). Studies 
have also examined the creation of automaticity in higher cognitive processes and its 
consequences (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). A study on CT revealed that the intensity levels 
of depressive thought in terms of content are not predictive for relapse, whereas their 
form (i.e. the automaticity and rapidity of depressive thoughts in respect of their 
deliberation and intentionality) is (Teasdale, 1999). Worrying and ruminating are 
unproductive, repetitive thinking styles that contribute to anxiety and depression, 
respectively. In another study it was hypothesized that repetitive thought itself is a 
general concomitant and a predictive factor of negative mood (Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, 
& Craske, 2000). 
The mindfulness perspective highlights that automaticity (cognitive, perceptual, 
or mnemonic) leads to the bias characteristic of dysfunctional thoughts, depressive 
ruminations, anxious worries, and obsessional thinking. Mindfulness operates in the 
opposite direction to automaticity and is likely able to do so in low-level perceptual as 
well as in high-level cognitive/memory processes (Ramel, Goldin, Caroma, & McQuaid, 
2004). One might wonder: is it really that simple? Yes, it is, but this seeming simplicity 
conceals profound implications, which when viewed in perspective involve not only 
clinical aspects but also our conceptualization of the mind and its nature. The repeated 
dis-identification/detachment through non-discursive mindful awareness from what we 
believe is real, is the fundament of the therapy. This core aspect has been recognized and 
referred to by the Buddhist tradition. The Anguttara Nikaya, an Early Buddhist text 
attributed to the Buddha, states: ‘It is not through actions or words that one gains freedom 
from mental afflictions but through seeing and acknowledging them over and over again.’ 
 
3. Non-conceptual conscious knowing versus metacognitive knowledge 
Is it possible to conceive a kind of knowledge that goes beyond conceptual thought? The 
mindfulness perspective shows us that there may be a form of knowledge that only 
appears when the ongoing discursive activity of the mind calms down and a space is 
created that permits the spontaneous emergence of silent awareness, a presence beyond 
words, concepts, thinking, and meaning. This non-conceptual mode of comprehension 
and of conscious attention to what appears in the mind opens the way for dis-
identification from the content of the mind: an act of immense therapeutic potential as 
was recently discovered by cognitive-behavior therapists. To refer to this kind of 
knowledge the notion of ‘metacognitive awareness’ has been coined, derived from the 
concept of metacognition. This has been reformulated to show that exists a knowledge 
which encompasses the different processes of thinking, and yet consists of an intuitive 
knowing, and immediate awareness. Metacognitive insight implies experiencing thoughts 
as thoughts as they occur (Teasdale, 1999). Teasdale, Hayhurst, Pope, and others (2002, 
p.227) pointed out that ‘It is important to distinguish metacognitive awareness from 
metacognitive belief, as the latter has figured prominently in recent theorizing on 
emotional disorders and their psychological treatments. Metacognitive beliefs refer to 
how much individuals believe particular thoughts about cognition to be true… and is 
concerned with thoughts about thoughts or feelings ... By contrast, metacognitive 
awareness refers to the extent to which thoughts are experienced as thoughts (mental 
events) rather than as aspects of self or direct reflections of truth.’ 
As Pensa (2002, pp.50-51) has observed, we are totally captivated by the 
indiscriminate fascination of thinking: ‘It is a sort of blind faith, in which we abandon 
ourselves to the supposedly magical power of thought and of rethinking, of compulsive 
cogitation or mental proliferation... It is precisely our attachment to proliferation that 
makes us blind to fundamental capabilities of the mind other than thought – in particular 
sati (awareness/mindfulness) and metta (unconditional loving kindness) – in other words 
the ability to confer upon the objects an affectionate and accepting awareness that is 
equally silent and non-judging.’ What is obscured by the proliferation of the discursive 
thought is precisely awareness, the very factor that is able to show us that thoughts are 
just thoughts and the possibilities of the mind are not just confined to thinking. This 
faculty of intuition embarrasses contemporary cognitive psychology as it is hard to 
categorize it within standard models of the mind, even though it was early recognized in 
western tradition, at least until the beginning of Modern Age. In none of Plato’s dialogues 
did Socrates, the quintessential symbol of discursive thought in modern philosophy, 
comprehensively define an Idea in purely logical-linguistic terms. Acute, discerning 
analysis was instead used to loosen up the intellectual ‘cramps’ that prevent an aperture 
towards the experience of an intuitive insight of the Idea (Friedlander, 1969). One way of 
make use of discursive reasoning still in use today is the Zen koan that utilizes paradoxes 
to go beyond discursive thinking. In Tibetan monasteries monks spend years exercising 
meticulous logical analysis and dialectics in order to be able to see beyond. Will a deeper 
understanding of mindfulness help reacquire mental faculties that make us more fully 
human?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Mindfulness-based training as an effective component in 
treating emotional disorders  
F. Giommi PhD*, H. Barendregt PhD*, L. Oliemeulen MA* *, J. van Hoof MD 
PhD*, J. Tinge MA°, A. Coenen PhD ° ° & P. van Dongen MA* *1
 
 
1. Introduction 
We adopted Kabat-Zinn’s (1990) MBSR program that has been applied in a variety of 
health care settings by several researchers (Kabat-Zinn, Massion, Kristeller, et al., 1992; 
Teasdale, Segal, Williams, 1995; Schwartz, 1997) in slightly different ways. A growing 
number of studies show significant reduction in medical and stress-related symptoms, 
including chronic pain, breast and prostate cancer, psoriasis. Baer’s (2003) review 
suggests that mindfulness is an effective component in treating a wide spectrum of 
emotional and psychiatric disorders. This includes decreasing Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder and Panic Disorder (Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn (1995), anxiety in non-
clinical populations exposed to stressful conditions (Astin, 1997; Shapiro, Schwartz, & 
Bonner, 1998), heterogeneous physical and psychological symptoms in a clinical 
population (Reibel, Greenson, Brainard, & Rosenzweig, 2001), mood disturbances and 
stress symptoms in cancer diagnosed patients (Speca, Carlson, Goodey, & Angen, 2000). 
In addition, several cognitive-behavioral programs that incorporate a substantial 
mindfulness component could reduce self-harm in Borderline Personality Disorder 
(Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, et al., 1991), Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Schwartz, 
1997, 1998), and Binge-Eating Disorder (Kristeller, & Hallet, 1999). Recently, Segal, 
Teasdale, and Williams (2002) has developed Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(MBCT) that combines Kabat-Zinn’s method with techniques drawn from CT, which has 
led to conceptual advances in the modeling of affective change in mood disorders 
(Teasdale, 1997; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2001). MBCT has turned out to be quite effective 
in the prevention of relapse in major depression (Teasdale, Segal, Williams, et al., 2000; 
Ma & Teasdale, 2004). However, the claimed effectiveness of mindfulness training needs 
to be investigated further (Bishop, 2002). Baer (2003), in her recent review incorporating 
meta-analytic procedures, concluded that in spite of significant methodological flaws, the 
current literature suggests that mindfulness-based interventions do help in a variety of 
mental health problems and improve psychological functioning. But, she insists that 
additional research and more rigorous tests should compare mindfulness-based 
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interventions with established treatments and that the effect of mindfulness needs to be 
investigated within a broader range of outcomes to further determine the mechanism 
through which mindfulness brings about clinical change. 
To our knowledge, no randomized controlled studies have ever been conducted to 
compare MBSR with other interventions, nor have neuropsychological measurements 
been included in order to investigate the attentional processes that are supposed to be 
specifically involved in mindfulness. The purpose of our study was to explore these 
issues. MBSR is a highly structured, manualized program. During the 8-week course 
participants attended a weekly 2.5 hour group session, in which they were guided through 
the program, motivated, inspired and supported by an MBSR experienced trainer (J.T.) 
educated at Kabat-Zinn's Centre. As a comparison, we offered Psychoeducation (PE), 
which as MBSR has a manualized group format and is widely used as a structured 
psychosocial intervention for in- and out-patient psychiatric populations. It consisted of 8 
weekly group meetings of 2.5 hours. In each session a psychiatrist (T.v.B.) educated and 
discussed with participants about their individual disorder’s characteristics (natural 
history, diagnosis, treatment, etc.) as well as on early detection and problem-solving 
techniques. The goal of PE was to promote the patients’ knowledge and understanding 
and to teach them how to improve their managing-capability of their symptoms. Outcome 
research supports PE’s designation as a ‘probably efficacious’ treatment and its use as an 
adjunct to pharmacotherapy for emotional disorders (Barton, 1999). In unipolar 
depression PE increased treatment adherence and significantly reduced symptomatology 
(van Dam, Hosman, Hoogduin, & Schaap, 2003; Rush, 1999; for a review see Cuijpers, 
1998). A large multicentre, randomized, controlled trial with depressives in the 
community showed reduction in number of cases and significant improvement in 
subjective and social functioning (Dowrick, Dunn, Ayuso-Mateos, et al., 2000). In 
bipolar disorders several studies showed PE to be an effective adjunct to pharmacological 
treatment that improves clinical outcome (Gonzales-Pinto, Gonzalez, Enjunto, et al., 
2004; Parikh, Kusumakar, & Haslam, 1997); a large randomized trial found a significant 
reduction of recurrence and a lasting effect (Colom, Vieta, Reinares, et al., 2003) that 
goes beyond mere compliance enhancement (Colom, Vitea, Martinez-Aran, et al., 2003). 
Although PE’s application in anxiety disorders was less studied, symptoms were 
significantly reduced following PE in elderly female depressives (Schimmel-Spreeuw, 
Linssen, Heeren, 2000); significant changes were found in youths with generalized social 
anxiety disorder (Chavira, & Stein, 2002).      
The present exploration aims at corroborating previous findings, suggesting that 
MBSR is an effective component in the treatment of emotional disorders, by comparing 
MBSR to PE, by investigating whether MBSR is able to improve attentional 
performance, and by collecting additional evidence to support mindfulness’ broad-
spectrum efficacy claim. The specific questions addressed are: (1) Is MBSR effective in a 
sample of emotionally disordered patients in terms of pre-post clinical measurements on 
depression and anxiety symptoms and on perceived quality of life as compared to PE, a 
standard treatment used in psychiatric settings? (2) Is MBSR able to enhance attentional 
performance on standard neuropsychological tests? (3) Are EEG pre-post changes in this 
sample comparable to those drawn from previous research on meditation in non-clinical 
populations? 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and Design. 2.1.1. Sample. At the onset we selected a sample of 25 
patients suffering from disturbances that met DSM-IV criteria for Anxiety or Mood 
Disorders. They were recruited at an institute for mental health care (GGZ, Oost-Brabant, 
Netherlands) and were either hospitalized during the research or within the five preceding 
years. During the study patients continued receiving medical Treatment As Usual (TAU). 
Exclusion criteria were any psychotic state related to a diagnosis of schizophrenia or 
mania. Patients gave their informed consent. No-one showed any signs of alcohol or drug 
abuse at the time of testing and none had severe neurological or physical illnesses that 
might influence the task performances. 
2.1.2. Design. We adopted a randomized pre-post comparison design with two 
comparison groups. According to Dutch legislation and recommendations of its ethical 
committee it was mandatory to give each control group an extra treatment besides the 
usual (medication) therapy. Therefore, no TAU or placebo control group was allowed. 
2.1.3. Assignment. Data were derived from a sample of 5 males and 20 females 
who met inclusion criteria and who attended the pre- and post- measurements. 
Participants were allotted to MBSR or PE through a matched random assignment. First, 
clients’ names were coded by using numbers, subsequently, a number was extracted 
randomly and the data corresponding with that specific number was paired with another 
number. Each pair was matched on the following variables: Sex, Age, Education, 
Hamilton Depression Scale and Continuous Performance Test scores. The average age 
was 41.00 (SD 11.42, range 22-69); the median of educational level was 4 (on a 7-point 
scale), which corresponds to a secondary education level. Of the 25, 14 were in-patients 
and 11 out-patients; 19 (76%) had a diagnosis related to Mood Disorders, and 6 (24%) to 
Anxiety Disorders. None of the Bipolar Mood Disorder patients was in a maniacal state 
at the time of the study. In the MBSR group (n = 14), 10 subjects had been diagnosed 
with Mood Disorder (4 Unipolar Major Depressive Disorder, 3 with Dysthymic Disorder, 
3 with Bipolar Disorder), and 4 with Anxiety Disorders (1 Anxiety Disorder NAO, 1 Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 2 Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia). In the PE group (n = 
11), 9 had been diagnosed with Mood Disorder (7 Unipolar Major Depression, 2 
Dysthymic Disorder) and 2 with Anxiety Disorder (1 Anxiety Disorder NAO, 1 Panic 
Disorder without Agoraphobia). To check the random assignment procedure, the two 
groups were compared by one-way ANOVA on the matched variables. No significant 
differences between groups were found on Sex (p .442), Age (p .823), Education (p .466), 
on the first session of Hamilton Depression Scale (p .464), and on Continuous 
Performance Test (p .831). 
2.2. Measurements. During two sessions, both pre- and post-, we measured 13 
outcome variables: 5 derived from clinical symptoms rating-scales, 2 related to a quality 
of life questionnaire, and 6 variables derived from 5 different neuropsychological tests. In 
the present text the clinical variables are sometimes referred to as C1… C5; the quality of 
life as Q1, Q2; and the neuropsychological-attentional ones as N1… N6.  
2.2.1. Clinical variables. To assess treatment effects, we administered five 
standard rating scales. C1: the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (17-items; score 
range: 0 - 52) (Hamilton, 1960; Williams, 1998). C2: the Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Anxiety (14-items; score range: 0 - 56) (Hamilton, 1959). Both are interviewer-scales and 
scored by a psychiatrist (M.R.). C3: the Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale is a self-
administered rating scale (20 items; score range: 20 – 80) (Zung, 1965). C4 and C5: the 
Visual Analogue Scales for Depression and for Anxiety are self-rating analogue 
indicators: symptom intensity is rated along a 0 to 100 line (Aitken, Zealley, & 
Rosenthal, 1969); they were administered by a psychiatrist (M.R.). 
2.2.2. Quality of life assessment. To evaluate changes in perceived quality of life, 
we used the extended Dutch version of the Lancashire Quality of Life Profile (LQLP). 
This questionnaire consists of 156 items, covering 11 different domains related to various 
aspects of life (van Nieuwenhuizen, 1998). Domains 1 to 6 are rated according to a 7-
point satisfaction scale (they refer to the perception of the different socio-economic 
aspects of life) and domains 7 to 11 are rated on a 3-point scale (they refer to the 
perception of more ‘self-related’ aspects of life). The psychometric properties of the 
extended Dutch version were found to be sound and in agreement with the original 
(Olivier, Huxley, Priebe, & Kaiser, 1997). We derived from this version two outcome 
variables: LQLP-3 (expressing the mean of the scores of the self-related domains) and 
LQLP-7 (incorporating the means of the external-related aspects). Two trained clinical 
researchers (L.O. and M.P.) administered the questionnaire. 
2.2.3. Neuropsychological variables. To assess treatment effect on attentional 
processes, we administered a test battery. It comprises five neuropsychological tests; 
from these we selected six variables - one task producing two different measurements. 
N1: the Stroop Color-Word Test is considered to measure selectivity of attention and 
executive function: a decrease in performance time means improvement. N2: Continuous 
Performance Test is designed to measure sustained attention and involves a rapid 
identification of a target while withholding response to distracting stimuli. The correct-
positive (hit) and incorrect-positive (false alarm) are registered. Perceptual sensitivity (d') 
was the outcome variable: such index of overall signal/noise discrimination 
(Nuechterlein, Edell, Norris, & Dawson, 1988) is considered to be closely related to the 
level of attentional arousal: high scores indicate better performances. In addition to the 
previous tests, we also used three tasks linked to executive and psychomotor functioning. 
The term psychomotor characterizes a variety of actions involving both attentional and 
sensorimotor processes. These three tasks were administered on a digitizing tablet 
allowing the precise recording of the pen movements made during the tests. This 
technique has recently been applied in psychiatric research to increase precision (Sabbe, 
Hulstijn, van Hoof, & Zitman, 1997). N3: the Trail Making Test B, from the Halstead-
Reitan Battery, is widely employed to specify test flexibility of attention, set-switching, 
visuomotor speed and working memory. The outcome measure consists of the time 
required to complete the task: the lower the score, the better the performance. N4: WISC-
Maze Test that is part of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Dutch version (de Bruyn 
& Hakvoort-Koomen, 1986), is considered to measure planning ability. The time needed 
to complete the mazes is the outcome variable: the lower the time, the better the 
performance. N5 and N6: the Digit Symbol Substitution Test is another subset of the 
Wechsler Scale; subjects are requested to substitute symbols for digits as quick as 
possible according to a key, for 90 seconds. The measure of this performance is the 
number of correct responses obtained and is referred to as ‘raw score’. The DST owes its 
clinical sensitivity in requiring selective attention, sustained attention, working memory, 
and visuomotor coordination; however, standard DST gives only the raw score, which 
make it impossible to identify the contributions of the different processes. By means of 
the digitizing tablet, we could differentiate between the motor component, (the time taken 
to write a symbol) and the cognitive component (sustained and selective attention, i.e. the 
time needed to match the current digit with the proper symbol). Thus, we have two 
outcome variables from DST. N5: Raw-score, the standard DST outcome: higher scores 
indicate better performance and N6: Matching-time, the specific attentional component: 
lower scores indicate improvement.  
2.2.4. EEG Measurements. 21 patients' EEGs (16 with Mood Disorders and 5 
with Anxiety Disorders) were recorded before and after the two treatments. Electrodes 
were placed according to the International 10-20 System on eleven locations (F3, F4, C3, 
C4, P3, T3, T4, P4, Fz, Cz, Pz); the right mastoid was used as reference. During 
recording the patients were quietly laying on a medical bed in a room isolated from the 
recording equipment. After placing the electrodes, a rest period of 15 minutes was 
considered. Then the EEG was recorded during 5 minutes with eyes open and 
subsequently 5 minutes with eyes closed. 
2.3. Procedure. Two cycles have been completed: the first including 14 patients, 
the second 19 patients. All subjects in the first cycle were inpatients; in the second were 3 
in-patients and 16 out-patients. Interventions have been offered at the same hospital 
where all the patients had their health care. At the beginning of each cycle, patients were 
informed that they would be assigned randomly to one of the groups after the first general 
session of measurements had been completed. Each participant had four individual 
consultations within a seven days’ span, prior to the first week of treatment: to complete 
the clinical ratings scales, to perform the neuropsychological tests and the LQLP, to get 
instruction from the MBSR or PE trainer, and to have the EEG measurements. This 
sequence was randomly alternated. Following the same procedure, the second set of 
measurements was completed within two weeks after the end of the trainings. To 
minimize biases related to expectancy of change, we calculated the neuropsychological 
results only after all the data had been collected. To avoid the experimenter effect as 
much as possible, neither the clinical researchers who administered the rating scales and 
the tests, nor the MBSR and PE trainers were involved in the research design or 
interpretation. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Data. To summarize: 13 outcome variables and EEG alpha-power have been 
determined in this study. Four variables (N1, N3, N4, N6) were checked as not being 
normally distributed and have been normalized by applying a natural-logarithmic 
transformation, indicated in the tables with Ln.  
Unfortunately, due to unintentional reasons, it was not possible to obtain a 
complete data set for eight of the patients who had been initially included in this study. 
Two patients missed their post appointment for the clinical ratings scales because they 
were involved at the same time in other hospital activities, whereas another 
misunderstood the instructions about the VAS scales. Technical problems with the tablet 
apparatus arose during the recording of the pre-training measurements of N3 in one case, 
and of N5 and N6 in another. Similarly, the post-training data of N3, N5, and N6 were 
not available for one case. A patient’s Q2 assessment was misplaced and the C4, C5, N5 
and N6 post-training records of one other subject were accidentally damaged. Therefore, 
full pre-post data set were obtained in 17 out of 25 cases. The descriptive statistics of this 
sample is shown in Table I. Due to the considerable number of cases with missing data, 
the 25-case sample obtained through standard missing-analysis procedure, resulted to 
differ too much from the 17-case sample. Moreover, after a trial we realized that such 
procedure destroyed part of the correlation structure between the different variables and 
therefore it did alter the real multivariate nature of the training effects. Thus, we decided 
not to make use of a missing-analysis procedure and to perform our comparison on the 
raw-data sample of 17 cases. We have not taken any stance regarding the missing data, 
except for the fact that the missings are supposed not to be related to the value that would 
have been measured. This implies that we consider a missing datum neither related to the 
value that would have been measured, nor to the other measurements of the subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Analysis. 3.2.1 Between-groups comparison. The main purpose of the 
analysis was to compare the outcome of MBSR and PE (grouping variable) on multiple 
variables. An alpha level of .05 was set. We considered that different subsets of the 
outcome variables were measuring, in a likely overlapping manner, the same constructs, 
such as depression and anxiety. Thus, we decided to adopt a multivariate approach. To 
compare the overall effect of MBSR with that of PE, MANOVA was run (SPSS10; 
GLM-Multivariate). For each outcome variable, the effect of the interventions was 
considered to be the difference of the measurement after the training minus those before 
the training. Therefore, the goal of this analysis was to look specifically at the Group X 
Time interaction to determine whether one group improved more than the other. The 
result, Wilks’ Lambda = .006 (F 35,589; df [1,19]; p .0067; eta-squared .994), shows a 
very significant difference in the sample means and a large effect size value, indicating 
that the effect may be considered as a clinically relevant one (Huberty & Petoskey, 2000, 
p.197).  
 
How, then, can such a multivariate difference be analyzed? 
 
Table II: MANOVAs between MBSR and PE groups 
Table I: MBSR and PE – Descriptive statistics and mean differences 
17.66 4.97 17.50 7.01 
13.33 6.5 10.50 6.96 - 4.33  (5.57)* - 7.0  (4.38)* 
16.22 4.76 16.12 7.25 
11.66 7.66 9.50 5.37 - 4.56  (6.19)* - 6.63  (4.84)* 
56.00 8.45 52.37 9.31 
48.88 11.87 46.25 11.92 - 7.11  (10.43)* - 6.13  (7.53)* 
61.33 18.91 52.50 25.34 
41.77 22.17 59.75 28.39 - 19.56  (29.85)* 7.25  (28.65) 
77.00 16.30 60.5 24.82 
56.33 30.65 57.75 30.70 - 20.67  (22.14)* - 2.75  (28.30)* 
4.30 .65 4.62 0.70 
4.41 .69 4.92 0.81 .12  (.39)* .30  (.42)* 
1.76 .25 1.79 .27 
1.96 .36 2.02 .42 .21  (.23)* .24  (.34)* 
3.72 .45 3.29 .29 
3.53 .44 3.34 .30 - .19  (.49)* .05  (.24) 
3.36 .94 3.35 1.07 
3.85 .74 3.62 .95 .49  (.58)* .27  (.36)* 
4.52 .58 4.31 .41 
4.37 .39 4.17 .28 - .15  (.30)* - .14  (.24)* 
3.37 .34 3.53 .50 
3.33 .41 3.51 .54 - .04  (.18)* - .02  (.19)* 
41.56 13.18 49.75 15.07 
44.77 11.76 53.25 16.23 3.22  (4.35)* 3.50  (2.98)* 
.544 .388 .270 .439 
.40 .320 .192 .429 - .14  (.15)* - .08  (.13)* 
Outcome variables 
a,
d 
Hamilton Depression PRE 
Hamilton Depression POST 
Hamilton Anxiety PRE 
Hamilton Anxiety POST 
Zung Depression PRE 
Zung Depression POST 
VAS Anxiety PRE 
VAS Anxiety POST 
VAS Depression PRE 
VAS Depression POST 
Lqlp_7 PRE 
Lqlp_7 POST 
Lqlp_3 PRE 
Lqlp_3 POST 
Stroop Test (Ln) PRE 
Stroop Test (Ln) POST 
CPT_d' PRE 
CPT_d' POST 
Trail-Making B (Ln) PRE 
Trail-Making B (Ln) POST 
WISC-Maze (Ln) PRE 
WISC-Maze (Ln) POST 
DST Raw-score PRE 
DST Raw-score POST 
DST Matching-time (Ln) PRE 
DST Matching-time (Ln) POST 
 MBSR  Mean, SD 
b   PE  Mean, SD c  MBSR and PE Mean Difference, SD 
 (Ln) = natural-logaritmic transformation 
a.  
 n = 9 (listwise) b.  
 n = 8 (listwise) c.  
The * indicates a positive change/improvement of the PO post mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d.  
Class of variables Wilks' Lambda     df    p-value eta-squared 
All 13 variables .006  (1,19) p = .0067*  .994 
 
Depression var. 
 
.850 
 
(1,19) 
 
p = .418** 
 
.150 
Anxiety var. .705 (1,19) p = .042** .295 
Quality of Life var. .945 (1,22) p = .551** .055 
Attentional var. .622 (1,18) p = .316** .378 
*Alpha = .05;   * *Alpha = .0125 (Bonferroni);    
(a) Consistent with our multivariate approach the 13 variables can be conceptually 
separated into different classes of partially overlapping measures, each class measuring a 
different construct; we defined four classes: depression (C1, C3, C4), anxiety (C2, C5); 
quality of life (Q1, Q2), and attentional processes (N1, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6). To examine 
whether the overall difference between treatments can be attributed to one or more of 
these four distinguished classes, we conducted a between-groups MANOVA on the pre-
post mean differences, for each class. We set an alpha value of .0125 adjusting 
(Bonferroni) for multiple comparisons. Results: the effect did not attain statistical 
significance for any class (see Table II).  
To further investigate between-group differences, additional (univariate) ANOVAs were 
conducted on each variable; none of the differences reached significance.  
 
(b) We then assessed the multivariate distinct (within) effect of each intervention 
on the 13 pre-post mean differences by mean of an extension of the MANOVA procedure 
based on the homoscedasticity assumption that is already implicit in the MANOVA 
procedure for assessing the difference between trainings. The extension was needed 
because the sample sizes of the two trainings were too small to make inference on them 
separately. An adjusted alpha value of 0.025 (Bonferroni) was set. Results: both 
treatments showed a (very) significant effect.2
                                                 
2   A slight modification is used of the test described in Muirhead (1982), Theorem 3.2.13, p. 98. In 
the formula we use 
  
XSXNT 12 ) '( −=  with X  being the average effect of a given Training, say 
Training 1, and S the estimated covariance structure of the effect of both Trainings. Hence, given the 
individual effects kXX ...1 for the patients of Training 1, and lYY ...1 for Training 2, one may take 
 ))) (() ') (((11
1 YYYYXXXX
lk
S jjii −−Σ+−−Σ−+−
=  
 and kN = . Moreover, m denotes the dimensionality of the X  values, 13=m when 
considering all variables. Then under the null-hypothesis that the expected value of X is 0, the statistic 
m
mlk
lk
T 1
2
2 −−+
−+
 is Fisher distributed with degrees of freedom .1, −−+ mlkm The 
For MBSR: Hotelling’s T Squared = 8175.22 (F 125,772; df [13,3]; p .0010). For 
PE: Hotelling’s T Squared = 22500.30; (F 346,158; df [13,3]; p .0002). Differences were 
in the expected direction: both MBSR and PE resulted in a within-group significant 
positive effect, corroborating previous research suggesting their efficacy.   
 
(c) In order to consider the clinical significance of the comparison of MBSR with 
PE, we analyzed the effect sizes of the between-group MANOVAs on each class of 
variables (see Table II). Notably, the between-groups eta-squared values – a multivariate 
effect size measure - evidenced that two classes exhibited a remarkable effect magnitude 
(Discussion 4.1c). The anxiety class showed a small but not trivial value of .295, while 
the attentional class showed a small-to-medium value of .378.3
Both these effect sizes might be interpreted as evidence in support of a larger clinical 
efficacy of MBSR. In the attentional class MBSR showed pre-post mean differences 
larger than PE on five out of six variables (see Table I). In the anxiety class a small 
difference unfavorable to MBSR on the variable C2 is balanced by a huge difference in 
favor to it on C5.  
  
Besides the between-group effect sizes, we considered the magnitude and the directions 
of the pre-post mean changes of each outcome variables: MBSR induced larger 
improvements than PE on three of the five clinical variables (C3, C4, C5) and on five of 
the six attentional variables (N1, N2, N4, N5, N6) (see Table I). Moreover, a close 
scrutiny evidenced that MBSR univocally induced a positive, systematic change in all the 
variables of all the four classes, whereas for PE such consistent improvement on all the 
variables of a given class is limited to depression and quality of life. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2. MBSR’s clinical significance. In addition to the between-group comparison, 
we are interested in the clinical and practical significance of MBSR. To this purpose, we 
refer here to a) the within-group effect sizes (see Table IV), and b) to the pairwise 
descriptive statistics of the MBSR group, that takes into account a larger set of data for 
                                                                                                                                                 
formula has been implemented by means of a Splus program. 
 
3  Cohen described effect sizes larger than d = .20 as small, d = .50 as medium, and d = .80 as large. 
TABLE III:  MBSR pairwise descriptive statistic and pre-post mean difference 
14.50  (6.62) -4.25*   (4.99) 1.077 7.423 12 
12.08  (6.81) -6.25*   (6.22) 2.295 10.205 12 
50.25  (10.46) -6.50*   (9.55) .427 12.573 12 
44.90  (23.12) -19.40*   (28.15) -.738 39.538 10 
59.10  (30.20) -18.20*   (22.28) 2.262 34.138 10 
4.31  (.66) .07*   (.40) -.310 .156 14 
1.83  (.36) .14*   (.21) -.264 -.011 14 
3.55  (.52) -.31*   (.48) .030 .589 14 
3.52  (1.01)  .33*   (.56) -.653 -.002 14 
4.39  (.43) -.16*   (.26) .013 .315 14 
3.34  (45) -.05*   (.16) -.043 .149 14 
43.67  (13.70) 3.08*   (4.62) -6.020 -.147 12 
.49  (.35) -.11*   (.15) .003 .209 11 
Outcome Variables                      Pre Mean, SD 
18.75  (6.28) Hamilton Depression 
18.33  (6.28) Hamilton Anxiety 
56.75  (8.41) Zung Depression 
64.30  (20.14) VAS Anxiety 
77.30  (15.39) VAS Depression 
4.23  (.66) Lqlp_7 
1.70  (.22) Lqlp_3 
3.86  (.60) Stroop Test (Ln) 
3.19  (.98) CPT_d' 
4.56  (.53) Trail-Making B (Ln) 
3.39  (.37) WISC-Maze (Ln) 
40.58  (13.06) DST Raw-score 
.60  (.37) DST Matching-time 
(Ln) 
Post Mean ,SD 
Pre-Post Mean 
Difference, SD Lower Upper 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Mindfulness-based Training 
N 
(pairwise) 
The * indicates a positive chan e/im rovement of the M an Difference 
each variable (see Table III).  
The effect sizes of the MBSR within-group differences assessed by mean of Cohen's d 
evidenced improvements of a substantial effect (i.e. larger than .20) on 12 of the 13 
variables, while PE showed substantial effects on 8 variables (see Table IV).  
Moreover, on the Hamilton Depression and Hamilton Anxiety Scales, the pre-post mean 
reductions were 23% and 36% respectively. This is in line with the 23% and 34% 
reductions on the Hamilton Depression and Hamilton Anxiety scales observed in 
previous research on MBSR with anxiety disorders (Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 
1995).  
 
Table IV: MBSR and PE  pre-post within effect sizes (d) 
  MBSR PE                  
Outcome variables N (pairwise)  Cohen's d N (pairwise)  Cohen's d 
Hamilton Depression 12   .85   large 11 1.25   large 
Hamilton Anxiety 12 1.00   large 11 1.00   large 
Zung Depression 12  .67   medium 11  .64    medium 
VAS Anxiety 10  .69   medium 11  .19   * 
VAS Depression 10  .82   large 11  .44   small 
Lqlp_7 14  .18   * 11  .64   medium 
Lqlp_3 14  .64   medium 10  .61   medium 
Stroop Test (Ln) 14  .64   medium 11  .15   * 
CPT_d' 14  .59   medium 11 .72   medium 
Trail-Making B (Ln) 14  .62   medium 9 .73   medium 
WISC-Maze (Ln) 14  .29   small 10  .11   * 
DST Raw-score 12  .67   medium 10  .17   * 
DST Matching-time(Ln) 11  .72   medium 10  .04   * 
* Not relevant effect in Cohen's terms 
The mean reductions on the Zung and VAS Depression / Anxiety were 11%, 24%, and 
30%, respectively; these instruments were not used in previous research. The MBSR size 
effects were large for three variables and medium for two, whereas those of PE: large for 
two, medium for two others, and not meaningful for one (see Table IV). As to the 
attentional variables, in MBSR five out of six showed within-group improvements with 
effect sizes of medium magnitude, whereas in PE only two did. 
 
3.2.3. EEG. The alpha power was calculated as the mean power of frequencies in 
the range 8-13 Hz. Data were log transformed for statistical analysis. To determine the 
experimental effects, repeated measures ANOVA with pre-post, conditions (eyes-open, 
eyes-closed), and electrode placement as within-subjects factors, and treatment (MBSR, 
PE) as between-subjects factor, was carried out. A significant increase in alpha power as 
a result of both treatments was found at all electrode locations for the whole sample (both 
groups): F = 6,060 (df [1,19]; p .023). 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Between-groups comparison. It might seem odd that the overall significant  
variability - as revealed by the Group X Time MANOVA between treatments - has not 
been resolved to a significant degree in any of the distinguished classes of variables 
(3.2.1. a and b). However, such result seems to support the conclusion that the difference 
that results in comparing the two trainings are of a very multivariate nature, crossing 
through all the classes of variables. In addition, it must be considered that on the one 
hand both MBSR and PE showed to be effective treatments (3.2.1. b), improving as a 
consequence most of the outcome variables of the two groups toward the same “positive” 
direction, and therefore reducing between-group differences. On the other hand, due to 
the previously described practical and ethical constrains to our clinical trial, the sample 
size and the statistical power of our study were rather limited. These two conjoint factors 
are likely to reduce the probability obtaining statistically significant differences in the 
between-groups multivariate comparisons on the distinct classes of variables, as well as 
in the univariate comparisons on single variables. 
In order to provide a more reliable interpretation of our data we decided to 
consider also their clinical and practical significance (3.2.1. c). Referring to the size of 
the effects provides useful information that can be used in judgments of practical and 
scientific importance of an effect (Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 2000, p.136). Consequently the 
magnitude of an effect might provide some support to a scientific hypothesis even when 
statistical significance has not been obtained. Moreover, Kirk (1966) remarked that 
Cohen's meaning of small, medium, and large effect (Cohen, 1997) remains 
approximately the same across the several different measures of effect sizes. In the 
present study the between-groups effect sizes evidenced that MBSR exhibited remarkable 
magnitudes in the anxiety and attentional classes: this result supports MBSR clinical 
efficacy. 
 
4.2. MBSR clinical significance. The MBSR within-group effect sizes evidence 
improvements of a substantial effect on 12 of the 13 variables, while PE shows 
substantial effects on 8 variables (see Table IV). For the clinical variables such 
magnitudes are consistent with those found in the literature on mindfulness training with 
anxious and depressed patients (Baer, 2003). These findings confirmed MBSR efficacy in 
decreaseing levels of psychological symptoms. Furthermore, because our sample 
included patients with several diagnoses, this result brings new evidence in favor of the 
claimed wide-range efficacy that appears to be peculiar for mindfulness.  
To date, no study has specifically investigated the effect of the MBSR on attentional 
processes, neither in normal subjects, nor in clinical populations. One aim was to explore 
the hypothesis that low-level automatic attentional processes may also, as was already 
shown for memory and metacognitive higher processes (Teasdale, 1999; Williams, 
1996), be modified by mean of mindfulness. The between-group MANOVA on the 
attentional class did not reach statistical significance (see Table II): this result did not 
support the hypothesis of a specific, differential effect of MBSR on attentional processes. 
However, once we considered the clinical meaning of the effect sizes observed in the 
MBSR group, it seems possible to collect some useful clues. Although between-groups 
comparison on the attention class was not statistically significant, it showed nonetheless a 
small-to-medium effect of .378 in favor of MBSR (Table II). Moreover, in the MBSR 
group, five of the six attention-related variables induced within-group improvements of 
medium magnitude, whereas in PE only two did (Table IV). All in all, these data seem to 
support the hypothesis that MBSR was able to specifically promote improvements in the 
low-level attentional processes involved in the neuropsychological tasks. However, this 
support is indirect, drawn from considerations based on the clinical significance of the 
observed effects sizes. Further study is needed. 
4.3. EEG. In adults the power in alpha frequencies band is inversely related to 
cortical activation (Davidson, 1995). The alpha power increase in the sample is 
interpreted as enhancement of the amount of relaxation or a decrease in tension or 
distress (Coenen, 1995). Both treatments are to be regarded as effective. This is 
consistent with previous research on meditation, which repeatedly indicates an increase 
of alpha power waves in non-clinical populations while practicing different forms of 
meditation (for a review: Jevning, Wallace, & Beidebach, 1992). Although the alpha 
power increased more in the MBSR group, no significant between-groups difference 
could be established. 
4.4. Limitations of this study. Four main limitations need to be discussed: (1) To 
obtain a larger sample we included different emotional disordered patients; this implies a 
mixed nature of our sample. In the outcome literature, it is usually accepted that the 
effectiveness of an intervention is studied only in relation to a specific clinical disorder. 
The rationale: it is unlikely that any one intervention is equally effective for different 
disorders. By mixing different diagnoses it might be possible to conceal the effects of the 
intervention on one disorder in the lack of effectiveness on other disorders. However, 
because we are interested in the proclaimed characteristic of MBSR as a wide-ranging 
treatment, this limitation might even be useful to study this aspect. (2) It was not in the 
scope of this study to assess long-term effects; thus, it cannot be concluded that the short-
term changes are lasting: this question should be answered by future longitudinal 
research. (3) The impossibility, due to ethical constrains, to set a TAU control group 
requires the necessary prudence with pre-post designs: other factors could have favored 
the positive changes. (4) The small sample size affected the statistical power and 
subsequently the chance to achieve statistical significance, particularly in the between-
group comparisons. 
4.5 Conclusions. A Group X Time MANOVA comparison between MBSR and 
PE revealed a significant difference. However, on the one hand, the between-groups 
MANOVA comparisons on the distinct classes of variables did not attain statistical 
significance; on the other hand, in the anxiety and attentional areas the effect sizes of 
such comparisons evidenced meaningful differences favorable to MBSR. This 
inconsistency might be explained by the both fact that both interventions produced 
distinct (within) significant improvements and the fact that the low statistical power (due 
to the small sample size) made it unlikely to detect possible significant yet small 
differences. Such results, together with the comprehensive consideration of the mean 
differences of the single outcome variables discussed above, might represent a hint for 
interpreting the significant difference revealed by the between-group MANOVA as a 
larger effect of MBSR compared to PE. Nevertheless, in spite of these clues in favor of 
MBSR, our conclusion is prudential: the present comparison study shows that MBSR 
resulted in being at least as efficacious as PE in promoting improvements in a number of 
outcome variables in a sample of patients suffering from emotional disorders. It is the 
first time, to our knowledge, that a comparison study has been conducted to evaluate the 
effects of MBSR in respect to a standard intervention established as ‘probably 
efficacious’ (Baer, 2003). Such conclusion provides new confidence in addition to what 
has already been found in research on MBSR as an effective component in treating 
emotional disorders. Furthermore, this is as yet the first study that explored attention-
related neuropsychological measures. Research on emotional disordered patients has 
evidenced neuropsychological attentional deficits on the same tasks we have used in the 
present study (Schatzberg, Posener, DeBattista, et al., 2000; MacLeod & Rutherford, 
1998). Our study yields support, even if only indirectly, to the hypothesis that MBSR 
might exert a positive effect on attentional processes. Our results indicate that further 
research is needed to determine the clinical effectiveness of mindfulness in the context of 
our present knowledge of mind (Barendregt, 1998).  
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